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EVIDENCE-Sexual Assault Victim's Prior Sexual Con-
duct Admissible if Three Conditions Met. State v. Gavigan,
111 Wis. 2d 150, 330 N.W.2d 571 (1983).
In State v. GaviganI the Wisconsin Supreme Court held
that evidence relating to a complainant's prior sexual con-
duct may be admitted in a sexual assault case if three condi-
tions are met.2 First, the evidence must serve to prove a fact
relevant to an issue in the case which is independent of the
complainant's prior sexual conduct. Second, the probative
value of the evidence must outweigh its prejudicial effect.
And third, the jury's consideration of the evidence must be
limited to the purpose for which it was admitted.
By so holding, the Gavigan majority4 circumvented Wis-
consin's rape shield law5 and established a new test for ad-
mitting evidence of a complainant's prior sexual conduct in
a sexual assault case. The court reasoned that, although
such evidence may not be admitted to show a complainant's
prior sexual conduct, the rape shield statute does not neces-
sarily preclude its admission for another purpose.6 The ma-
1. 111 Wis. 2d 150, 330 N.W.2d 571 (1983).
2. Id. at 157, 330 N.W.2d at 576.
3. Id. at 157-58, 330 N.W.2d at 576.
4. Justice Callow delivered the opinion of the court in which Justices Day, Stein-
metz and Ceci joined. Justice Heffernan dissented, joined by Chief Justice Beilfuss
and Justice Abrahamson.
5. Wis. STAT. § 972.11(2)(b) (1981-82) provides:
If the defendant is accused of a crime under s. 940.225 [sexual assault], any
evidence concerning the complaining witness's prior sexual conduct or opin-
ions of the witness's prior sexual conduct and reputation as to prior sexual
conduct shall not be admitted into evidence during the course of the hearing or
trial, nor shall any reference to such conduct be made in the presence of the
jury, except the following, subject to s. 971.31(11):
1. Evidence of the complaining witness's past conduct with the defendant.
2. Evidence of specific instances of sexual conduct showing the source or ori-
gin of semen, pregnancy or disease, for use in determining the degree of sexual
assault or the extent of injury suffered.
3. Evidence of prior untruthful allegations of sexual assault made by the
complaining witness.
Wis. STAT. § 971.31(11) (1981-82) provides:
In actions under s. 940.225, evidence which is admissible under s. 972.11(2)
must be determined by the court upon pretrial motion to be material to a fact
at issue in the case and of sufficient probative value to outweigh its inflam-
matory and prejudicial nature before it may be introduced at trial.
6. Gavigan, 111 Wis. 2d at 157, 330 N.W.2d at 576.
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jority noted that such evidence was relevant to whether the
complainant consented to the incident in question,7 and was
thus potentially admissible under the new three-pronged
test.
This note will briefly address the rape shield laws and,
more specifically, show how courts in jurisdictions with stat-
utes similar to Wisconsin's have applied them to the issue of
consent in sexual assault cases. It will also review the Gavi-
gan opinion and, in light of the Wisconsin Legislature's re-
cent response to the decision,8 examine the impact of the
majority holding on future sexual assault cases in Wisconsin.
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In August 1980, Michael Gavigan was charged with sec-
ond-degree sexual assault.9 At trial the complainant, S.E.,
admitted she had let a strange man, Gavigan, into her apart-
ment at 4:00 a.m. He was apparently locked out of his apart-
ment and she invited him to stay on her couch. According to
Gavigan, S.E. then voluntarily engaged in sexual acts lead-
ing up to and including sexual intercourse. S.E. testified that
Gavigan threatened her with physical violence and forced
her to have sexual intercourse without her consent.' 0
The prosecution, over defense objection, introduced evi-
dence that S.E. was a virgin prior to the incident.I This evi-
dence took three forms: direct testimony by S.E. that she
7. Id. at 157, 330 N.W.2d at 576. Lack of consent is a necessary element of a rape
prosecution. Wis. STAT. § 940.225 (1981-82) provides in relevant part: "(2) SECOND
DEGREE SEXUAL ASSAULT. Whoever does any of the following is guilty of a Class C
felony: (a) Has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with another person without con-
sent of that person by use or threat of force or violence." See also Baldwin v. State,
59 Wis. 2d 116, 124, 207 N.W.2d 630, 634 (1973) (if a woman consents at anytime
prior to penetration, the act does not constitute rape). For a discussion of consent as
an affirmative defense to rape see generally Hibey, The Trial of a Rape Case.- An
Advocate's Analysis of Corroboration, Consent, and Character, 11 Am. CRIM. L. REv.
309, 321-23 (1973).
8. See infra note 113 and accompanying text for the legislature's response.
9. Wis. STAT. § 940.225(2)(a) (1981-82).
10. State v. Gavigan, 111 Wis. 2d 150, 153-54, 330 N.W.2d 571, 574-75 (1983).
11. Id. at 153, 330 N.W.2d at 574. Defense counsel objected to the admission of
such evidence on the grounds that it involved the victim's prior sexual conduct and,
therefore, must be excluded under the rape shield law. Id. Note that the introduction
of evidence of a rape victim's prior sexual conduct is commonly a defense tactic.
Hibey, supra note 7, at 326.
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was a virgin, 12 testimony by S.E. as to the conversation be-
tween her and Gavigan which indirectly indicated she was a
virgin 13 and testimony by Dr. Nathan Hilrich, who ex-
amined S.E. after the incident. 14 The trial court ruled all this
evidence relevant and admitted it.15
Gavigan was found guilty of second-degree sexual as-
sault and appealed on the grounds that the trial court, in
light of the rape shield law, erred in admitting evidence of
S.E.'s prior sexual conduct. The Wisconsin Court of Ap-
peals agreed and remanded the case for a new trial.' 6 The
Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed, adopting a new test for
admitting evidence of a rape victim's prior sexual conduct. 7
II. ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE OF A RAPE VICTIM'S
PRIOR SEXUAL CONDUCT
A. Rape Shield Laws
At present, forty-seven states have statutes governing the
admissibility of testimony regarding a rape victim's sexual
12. On direct examination S.E. testified as follows:
"Q What did you say?
"A I said no .... That I never did that with anyone.
"Q What did you mean?
"A I never made love to any one.
"Q You were 23 years old and you were a virgin?
"A Yes."
Gavigan, 111 Wis. 2d at 158, 330 N.W.2d at 576.
13. On direct examination S.E. testified:
"He - kept trying to pull me down to the bed to lay down next to him and I
kept saying no, that I, you know, that I didn't do that. That that wasn't what I
did. I wasn't that type of girl and that - and that I didn't know him and I just
asked him to leave me alone."
Id. at 160, 330 N.W.2d at 577. On cross-examination, S.E. again testified that she
rejected Gavigan's suggestion they have intercourse, stating: "I said I didn't do that
with anyone. I don't do that. I'm not that type of girl." Id.
14. Dr. Hilrich testified he observed a small tear in S.E.'s hymen. He opined that
S.E. was virgin prior to the incident. Id. at 155, 330 N.W.2d at 575.
15. Id. at 153, 330 N.W.2d at 574. In response to defense counsel's objection, the
court agreed to instruct the jury that the virginity evidence was not an opinion as to
the victim's prior sexual conduct but, rather, was offered to prove only S.E.'s physical
condition and state of mind. Id.
16. Id. at 155-56, 330 N.W.2d at 575. The court of appeals recognized consent as
the key issue in this case and held that the error was not harmless because the jury
could have inferred that, because S.E. was a virgin, she did not consent to sexual
intercourse. Id.
17. See supra text accompanying note 3 for the test.
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history.' 8 These statutes generally restrict the situations in
which a rape victim's prior sexual conduct may be brought
to the attention of the jury,19 eliminating the common-law
rule that such evidence is always admissible.20  The com-
mon-law rule was based on the theory that if a woman could
be shown to be unchaste, it could then be inferred that she
consented to sex with the defendant.2' The changing moral
climate in this country and the marked increase in premari-
18. ALA. CODE § 12-21-203 (Supp. 1982); ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.045 (1980); ARK.
STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1810.1 to .2 (1977); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1103 (West 1967 & Supp.
1983); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-407 (1978 & Supp. 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 54-86f (West 1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3509 (1979); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 794.022 (West 1976 & Supp. 1983); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2-3 (1982); HAWAII REV.
STAT. § 707.742 (Supp. 1982); IDAHO CODE § 18-6105 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 115-7 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-4 (Bums Supp.
1983); IOWA CODE ANN. § 813.2 R. 20(5) (West 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-447a
(1976); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.145 (Baldwin Supp. 1982); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 15:498 (West 1981); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 461A (1982 & Supp. 1983); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 21B (West Supp. 1983-1984); MICH. CoNtIP. LAWS ANN.
§ 750.520j (West Supp. 1983-1984); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.347 (West Supp. 1983);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-70 (Supp. 1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.015 (Vernon Supp.
1983); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-503(5) (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-321 to -323
(1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 50.090 (1981); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:6 (Supp.
1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-32.1 to .2 (west Supp. 1983-1984); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 30-9-16 (1978); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.42 (McKinney 1981); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 8-58.6 (1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-14 (1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2907.02(D)-.02(F) (Page 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 750 (west Supp. 1982-
1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.475 (1977); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3104 (Purdon
1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-13 (1981); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-659.1 (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1982); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-22-15 (1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-
17-119 (1982); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.13 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13, § 3255 (Supp. 1983); VA. CODE § 18.2-67.7 (1982); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 9A.44.020 (1983); W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-12 (1983); Wis. STAT. § 972.11(2)(b)
(1981-82); Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-312 (1983).
19. See, e.g., State v. Gilbert, 109 Wis. 2d 501, 513 n.15, 326 N.W.2d 744, 750
n. 15 (1982). See also Heiman, Public Policy Issues in the Prosecution of SexualAssault
Cases, 17 J. NAT'L DIST. ATT'Y's A. 24, 27 (1983). Tanford & Bocchino, Rape Victim
Shield Laws and the Sixth Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 544, 544 (1980).
20. Cases following the old common-law rule include State v. Guerrero, 58 Ariz.
421, 120 P.2d 798 (1942); People v. Burnette, 39 Cal. App. 2d 215, 102 P.2d 799
(1940); Boyd v. Commonwealth, 219 Ky. 62, 292 S.W. 478 (1927); Brown v. State, 72
Miss. 997, 17 So. 278 (1895); Young v. Johnson, 123 N.Y. 226, 25 N.E. 363 (1890); Lee
v. State, 132 Tenn. 655, 179 S.W. 145 (1915); State v. Hollenbeck, 67 Vt. 34, 30 A. 696
(1894); State v. Golden, 90 W. Va. 496, 111 S.E. 320 (1922); Kaczmarzyk v. State, 228
Wis. 247, 280 N.W. 362 (1938).
21. See, e.g., People v. Allen, 289 Ill. 218, 220, 124 N.E. 329, 330 (1919). Seealso
Comment, The Kentucky Rape Shield Law: One Step Too Far, 66 KY. L.J. 426, 428-
30 (1977).
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tal sex22 has discredited the rationale that there is any corre-
lation between the amount of sexual activity a woman has
engaged in and the likelihood that she consented to the inci-
dent in question.23 Accordingly, enlightened legislatures
have passed rape shield laws "aimed at eliminating a com-
mon defense strategy of trying the complaining witness
rather than the defendant." 24
The rape shield laws vary in scope and procedural de-
tails. Thirteen states have broad statutes which admit prior
sexual history evidence merely on a showing of relevance.26
These statutes are based on the traditional evidence rule
22. See generally M. HUNT, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE 1970's (1974) (docu-
menting an increase in premarital sex throughout the country).
23. See Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom,
77 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 15-22 (1977); Ordover, Admissibility of Patterns of Similar Sex-
ual Conduct: The Unlamented Death of Character For Chastity, 63 CORNELL L. REV.
90, 97-102 (1977); see also infra note 47 and accompanying text; cf. People v. Mitchell,
44 Mich. App. 679, 690, 205 N.W.2d 876, 881 (1973) (Bronson, J., dissenting) (stating
that there are a number of reasons why the victim may consent to sexual relations
with a third person but refuse defendant).
24. State v. Williams, 224 Kan. 468, 470, 580 P.2d 1341, 1343 (1978). See also
Ranii, States' New Rape Laws Taking Hold, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 5, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
25. See Tanford & Bocchino, supra note 19, at 591-602. For a more detailed
analysis of some of these statutes, see generally Comment, supra note 21; Comment,
Admissibility of Character Evidence in Rape Prosecutions in Missouri, 41 Mo. L. REV.
506 (1976) (Missouri's rape shield law); Note, Act 197 of.1977: Arkansas'Rape Shield
Statute, 32 ARK. L. REV. 806 (1979); Note, Rape - Admissibility of Victim's Prior
Sexual Conduct- What is the Law in Texas?, 31 BAYLOR L. REV. 317 (1979) (Texas'
rape shield law); Note, Evidence - Impeaching Credibility - Prior Sexual Experi-
ence, 15 DUQ. L. REV. 155 (1976) (Pennsylvania's rape shield law); Note, The Illinois
Rape Shield Statute: Privacy at Any Cost?, 15 J. MAR. L. REV. 157 (1982); Note,
Evidence: Evidence of Prosecutrix' Sexual Relations With Persons Other Than Defend-
ant in Rape Prosecutions, 29 OKLA. L. REV. 742 (1976); Note, The Constitutionality of
North Carolina's Rape Shield Statute, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 781 (1981); Note,
Evidence: Rape Victim Protection, 18 WASHBURN L.J. 665 (1979) (Kansas' rape shield
law); Note, Evidence -Admissibility of Victim's Past Sexual Behavior Under Washing-
ton's Rape Evidence Law, 52 WASH. L. REV. 1011 (1977).
26. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-407 (1978 & Supp. 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 54-86f (West 1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022 (West 1976 & Supp. 1983); HAwAII
REV. STAT. § 707.742 (Supp. 1982); IDAHO CODE § 18-6105 (1979); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-447a (1976); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-70 (Supp. 1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-
16 (1978); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.42 (McKinney 1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-
13 (1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-22-15 (1979); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 21.13 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983); Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-312 (1983). For a discussion of
traditional relevancy rules see generally T. BARLAND, THE WISCONSIN RULES OF EV-
IDENCE: A COURTROOM HANDBOOK 32-35 (1983) (chapter on relevant evidence and
limitations on its admissibility); T. WARSHAFSKY, TRIAL HANDBOOK FOR WISCONSIN
LAWYERS 212-20 (1981) (discussion of relevancy).
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which requires that relevance outweigh prejudicial effect.
Six other states have similar statutes, but specify a few situa-
tions in which prior sexual conduct evidence may not be ad-
mitted.27 In Iowa, for example, evidence of the victim's
sexual conduct with persons other than the accused, occur-
ring more than one year before the crime, is never
admissible.28
The majority of states have more restrictive statutes
which set up the general rule that sexual history evidence
may not be admitted.29 These statutes generally prohibit the
introduction of sexual history evidence except in a few nar-
rowly defined circumstances. The trial judge is stripped of
all discretion to balance relevancy against prejudicial ef-
fect.3 0 Evidence of the victim's prior sexual conduct is either
admissible under one of the enumerated exceptions, or pro-
hibited.3' Only five of these statutes contain exceptions
27. ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.045 (1980); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3509 (1979);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 813.2 R. 20(5) (West 1979); NEv. REV. STAT. § 50.090 (1981); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-32.1 to .2 (West Supp. 1983-1984); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-
20-14 (1976).
28. IOWA CODE ANN. § 813.2, R. 20(5) (West 1979).
29. ALA. CODE § 12-21-203 (Supp. 1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1810.1 to .2
(1977); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1103 (West 1967 & Supp. 1983); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2-3
(1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-7 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-1984); IND. CODE
ANN. § 35-37-4-4 (Burns Supp. 1983); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.145 (Baldwin
Supp. 1982); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:498 (West 1981); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 461A (1982 & Supp. 1983); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 21B (West Supp.
1983-1984); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520j (West Supp. 1983-1984); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 609.347 (West Supp. 1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.015 (Vernon Supp.
1983); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-503(5) (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-321 to -323
(1979); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:6 (Supp. 1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-58.6
(1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(D)-.02(F) (Page 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 22, § 750 (West Supp. 1982-1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.475 (1977); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 3104 (Purdon 1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-659.1 (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1982); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-17-119 (1982); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3255 (Supp.
1983); VA. CODE § 18.2-67.7 (1982); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.020 (1983); W.
VA. CODE § 61-8B-12 (1983); WIS. STAT. § 972.11(2)(b) (1981-82).
30. Tanford & Bocchino, supra note 19, at 596-602. See also People v. Dawsey,
76 Mich. App. 741, 758, 257 N.W.2d 236, 243 (1977) (Kaufman, J., dissenting in part,
concurring in part) (trial judge stated that rape shield statute allowed him no discre-
tion in permitting questioning of rape victim's sexual history).
31. Tanford & Bocchino, supra note 19, at 596-97.
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which allow prior sexual conduct into evidence when con-
sent is at issue.32
Wisconsin's statute falls into the category of statutes
which generally prohibit the introduction of sexual history
evidence except in a few narrowly defined circumstances.
None of its enumerated exceptions to the general rule of in-
admissibility mention prior sexual conduct as being admissi-
ble on the issue of consent.3 Since the Wisconsin Supreme
Court created an exception to this rule in State v. Gavigan,4
the remainder of this section will demonstrate how courts in
jurisdictions with similar statutes have applied the statutes to
the issue of consent in rape cases.
B. Judicial Application: The Issue of Consent
The majority of states with rape shield laws similar to
Wisconsin's have refused to admit evidence of the complain-
ant's prior sexual conduct as probative of consent to sexual
intercourse with the defendant. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court decision in State v. Gavigan 31 represents the minority
approach.
In Johnson v. State,36 the prosecuting attorney on direct
examination of the complainant brought out that, prior to
the incident in question, the complainant was a virgin.37
The Georgia Court of Appeals held that such evidence was
clearly prohibited by the state's rape shield law.38 In ruling
the virginity evidence inadmissible, the court yielded to leg-
32. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2-3 (1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.347 (West Supp.
1983); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 28-321 to -323 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 50.090 (1981);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-58.6 (1981).
33. See Wis. STAT. § 972.11(2)(b) (1981-82).
34. 111 Wis. 2d 150, 330 N.W.2d 571 (1983).
35. 111 Wis. 2d 150, 330 N.W.2d 571 (1983).
36. 146 Ga. App. 277, 246 S.E.2d 363 (1978).
37. Id. at _ 246 S.E.2d at 364. On direct examination the complainant testified
that when the appellant began to have intercourse with her he asked her certain ques-
tions. The prosecutor pursued that line of questioning:
"Q Okay, what - what questions did he ask you?
A He asked me. . . was I a virgin?
Q Okay, and what was your answer. .. ?
A Yes."
38. Id. at - 246 S.E.2d at 366. But cf. Jenkins v. State, 156 Ga. App. 387, 274
S.E.2d 618 (1980) (rape shield law was not violated by admitting examining doctor's
testimony that victim had been a virgin at time of the crime). Jenkins is discussed
infra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
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islative intent stating: "To permit the evidence which the
statute seeks to control to be admitted for reasons or in ways
not provided by the statute would rob the statute of its effi-
cacy and thwart the obvious intent of the legislature." 39 The
court also dismissed as "wholly without merit"40 the argu-
ment that the virginity evidence was relevant to the issue of
whether the victim consented to the defendant's advances.4'
Similarly, defense counsel in State v. Galloway42 was pre-
vented from asking the complainant, "Are you or are you
not a virgin? ' 43 The Supreme Court of North Carolina up-
held the trial court, holding that such a question was inad-
missible under the statute providing that the sexual behavior
of the complainant is irrelevant to any issue in a rape prose-
cution.44 The court also noted: "'Naked inferences of prior
sexual activity by a rape victim with third persons, without
more, are irrelevant to the defense of consent in a rape
trial.' -41
This idea was echoed by the Kentucky Court of Appeals
in Smith v. Commonwealth ,46 wherein the court stated that
"evidence of prior sexual conduct has little probative value,
39. Johnson, 146 Ga. App. at _, 246 S.E.2d at 365.
40. Id.
41. Id. at _ 246 S.E.2d at 364-65.
42. 304 N.C. 485, 284 S.E.2d 509 (1981).
43. Id. at _, 284 S.E.2d at 512.
44. Id. at., 284 S.E.2d at 513. However, note that N.C. GEN. STAT. § 38-58.6
(1981) allows the admission of prior sexual conduct evidence in a few specifically
enumerated exceptions:
(b) The sexual behavior of the complainant is irrelevant to any issue in the
prosecution, unless such behavior:
(1) Was between the complainant and the defendant; or
(2) Is evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior offered for the pur-
pose of showing that the act or acts charged were not committed by the
defendant; or
(3) Is evidence of a pattern of sexual behavior so distinctive and so closely
resembling the defendant's version of the alleged encounter with the
complainant as to tend to prove that such complainant consented to
the act or acts charged or behaved in such a manner as to lead the
defendant reasonably to believe that the complainant consented; or
(4) Is evidence of sexual behavior offered as the basis of expert psycholog-
ical or psychiatric opinion that the complainant fantasized or invented
the act or acts charged.
45. Galloway, 304 N.C. at _, 284 S.E.2d at 513 (quoting State v. Fortney, 301
N.C. 31, 44, 269 S.E.2d 110, 117 (1980)).
46. 566 S.W.2d 181 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
1984]
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at best. '47 The court held that evidence of a rape victim's
prior sexual conduct was plainly prohibited by statute from
being admitted when consent is at issue.48 Since the Ken-
tucky statute allows such evidence only to show past conduct
with the accused,4 9 the trial court properly excluded testi-
mony that the complainant had engaged in sexual inter-
course with her boyfriend five days prior to the incident in
question.50
Louisiana also has a narrow rape shield law which gener-
ally prohibits all evidence of the complainant's prior sexual
conduct.-" Like Kentucky's statute, there is an exception for
"incidents arising out of the victim's relationship with the
accused."52  Nevertheless, defense counsel in State v.
Domangue53 attempted to cross-examine the victim regard-
ing her past sexual relationships with various men other than
the defendant. 4 The Louisiana Supreme Court applied the
plain language of the statute and held that it clearly pre-
cluded the admission of such evidence on the issue of
consent.
A few courts have circumvented the more narrow rape
shield laws and admitted evidence of a rape victim's prior
sexual conduct.56 However, none of them have done so on
the issue of consent, as the Wisconsin Supreme Court did in
47. Id. at 183. See also People v. Dawsey, 76 Mich. App. 741, 752, 257 N.W.2d
236, 240 (1977) (consent to sex with others does not make it more likely complainant
consented to sex with defendant); State v. Green, 260 S.E.2d 257, 261 (W. Va. 1979) (a
rape victim's previous sexual conduct with other persons has very little probative
value as to consent to intercourse with a particular person at a particular time).
48. Smith, 566 S.W.2d at 183.
49. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.145 (Baldwin Supp. 1982).
50. Smith, 566 S.W.2d at 184.
51. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:498 (West 1981). See also Tanford & Bocchi-
no, supra note 19, at 596.
52. State v. Domangue, 350 So. 2d 599, 601 (La. 1977) (quoting LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 15:498 (West 1975)).
53. 350 So. 2d 599 (La. 1977).
54. Id. at 601. Defendant argued that past jurisprudence indicated this was a
proper line of inquiry. See supra note 20.
55. Domangue, 350 So. 2d at 601.
56. See, e.g., Wooten v. State, 361 So. 2d 1192 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978). For addi-
tional cases following the majority position that a rape victim's prior sexual conduct is
inadmissible under the applicable rape shield statute, see People v. Blackburn, 56 Cal.
App. 3d 685, 128 Cal. Rptr. 864 (1976); People v. Khan, 80 Mich. App. 605, 264
N.W.2d 360 (1978).
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State v. Gavigan .:
Jenkins v. State58 is similar to Gavigan in that a physician
who examined the complainant testified that the complain-
ant was a virgin at the time of the crime.59 The defendant
appealed on the grounds such testimony was admitted in vi-
olation of Georgia's rape shield law.60 The Georgia Court of
Appeals held that the doctor's testimony was admissible to
show the physical injuries complainant received during the
rape.6 1 The court did not consider this testimony as evidence
of the victim's prior sexual conduct.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court drew an even finer
distinction in admitting virginity evidence in State v. Pres-
ton.62 New Hampshire's rape shield law also precludes all
sexual history evidence except that showing conduct be-
tween the victim and the accused. 63 The trial court in Pres-
ton admitted into evidence testimony by the victim that the
incident in question was "her first sexual encounter." 64 The
court held this was not error under the rape shield law "be-
cause that statute excludes evidence of certain prior sexual
activity of the victim, not evidence of the victim's
virginity.' 65
III. THE GAvIGAN OPINIONS
A. The Majority
Justice Callow, writing for the majority in a case of first
impression,66 began by acknowledging that "[mI]any courts
57. 111 Wis. 2d 150, 330 N.W.2d 571 (1983).
58. 156 Ga. App. 387, 274 S.E.2d 618 (1980).
59. Id. at __ 274 S.E.2d at 620.
60. See GA. CODE ANN. § 38-202.1 (Supp. 1979) (current version at GA. CODE
ANN. § 24-2-3 (1982)).
61. Jenkins, 156 Ga. App. at _ 274 S.E.2d at 620.
62. 121 N.H. 147, 427 A.2d 32 (1981).
63. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:6 (Supp. 1979).
64. Preston, 121 N.H. at _ 427 A.2d at 33.
65. Id. at __ 427 A.2d at 33-34 (emphasis in original). But see State v. Gavigan,
111 Wis. 2d 150, 159, 330 N.W.2d 571, 576 (1983) (plain meaning of words "prior
sexual conduct" includes lack of sexual activity as well).
66. Wis. STAT. § 972.11(2)(b) was also at issue before the Wisconsin Supreme
Court in State v. Clark, 87 Wis. 2d 804, 275 N.W.2d 715 (1979). However, in that
case the court addressed only the issue of whether the trial court abused its discretion
in ordering a new trial.
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and state legislatures have recognized that a complainant's
consent or lack of consent to sexual intercourse with third
parties on other occasions is not a reliable indicator as to
whether she consented to intercourse with the defendant." 67
The court noted such evidence should normally be excluded
at trial and proceeded to outline Wisconsin's rape shield law
which precludes "the admission of prior sexual conduct
evidence. 68
The court then set up the new test for admitting such evi-
dence by stating "[t]he fact that evidence may not be admit-
ted to show a complainant's prior sexual conduct does not
necessarily, however, preclude its admission for another pur-
pose. ' 69 Evidence relating to a complainant's prior sexual
conduct 7° may be admitted in a sexual assault case if three
conditions are met. First, the evidence must serve to prove a
fact independent of the complainant's prior sexual conduct
which is relevant to an issue in the case. Second, the proba-
tive value of the evidence must outweigh its prejudicial ef-
fect.71 Third, the jury's consideration of this evidence must
be limited to the purpose for which it was admitted by an
appropriate instruction.72
The court then applied this test to the three forms of evi-
dence admitted at trial which suggested that S.E. was a vir-
gin.73 The first piece of evidence was the direct testimony by
S.E. during which she stated she was a virgin at the time of
the incident.74 The court stated that this evidence did not
67. State v. Gavigan, 111 Wis. 2d 150, 156, 330 N.W.2d 571, 575 (1983). See also
supra text accompanying note 45.
68. Gavigan, 111 Wis. 2d at 156, 330 N.W.2d at 575.
69. Id. at 157, 330 N.W.2d at 576.
70. Note that the court indicates the plain meaning of the words "prior sexual
conduct" includes the lack of sexual activity as well. Id. at 158-59, 330 N.W.2d at
576. But see State v. Preston, 121 N.H. 147, _ 427 A.2d 32, 33-34 (1981) (court
draws distinction between virginity and prior sexual activity). Preston is discussed
supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
71. Gavigan, 111 Wis. 2d at 157, 330 N.W.2d at 576. The court based the first two
criteria of the test on its reading of Wis. STAT. § 971.31(1 1) (1981-82).
72. Id. at 157-58, 330 N.W.2d at 576. The third criterion is based on Wis. STAT.
§ 901.06 (1981-82) which provides: "When evidence which is admissible as to one
party or for one purpose but not admissible as to another party or for another purpose
is admitted, the judge, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and
instruct the jury accordingly."
73. See Gavigan, IlI Wis. 2d at 158, 330 N.W.2d at 576.
74. Id. See supra note 12.
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fall within any of the three listed exceptions to the rape
shield law. Nor did it establish, under the court's test, a fact
independent of the complainant's prior sexual conduct rele-
vant to an issue in the case. Therefore, this testimony was
inadmissible.75
At trial S.E. also testified to the conversation between her
and Gavigan during the incident, which indirectly indicated
she was a virgin.76 Although the court noted that "[i]ndirect
references to a complainant's virginity are also generally
inadmissible, ' 77 such testimony was highly probative on the
issue of consent.78 It "demonstrated not only her virginity
but also her unwillingness to engage in sexual intercourse
with him.'79 Therefore, the conversation evidence was ad-
missible under the court's test because it served to prove an
independent fact relevant to a material issue in the case, that
is, consent. The court also noted that since the conversation
only implied S.E.'s virginity, its prejudicial effect was
attenuated.80
The third piece of evidence in question involved Dr.
Hilrich's testimony that he observed a tear in S.E.'s hymen.8
Because such evidence normally establishes a first act of sex-
ual intercourse, 82 it was inadmissible under the rape shield
law as evidence of prior sexual conduct.83 However, the
court found such evidence to be highly probative on the is-
sue of consent because "[iun a sexual assault case physical
75. Gavigan, 111 Wis. 2d at 158-59, 330 N.W.2d at 576-77. The court later noted
that the admission of this evidence was harmless error because the remainder of the
physical evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to convict Gavigan. Id. at 164, 330
N.W.2d at 579. See also Wold v. State, 57 Wis. 2d 344, 356-57, 204 N.W.2d 482, 490-
91 (1973) (test for harmless error is whether appellate court can conclude there is
sufficient evidence, other than and uninfluenced by the inadmissible evidence, which
would convict the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt).
76. Gavigan, 111 Wis. 2d at 160, 330 N.W.2d at 577. See supra note 13.
77. Id. at 159, 330 N.W.2d at 577
78. Id. at 161, 330 N.W.2d at 577.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 161, 330 N.W.2d at 577-78. The court went on to state that the limiting
instruction given by the trial court was inadequate to meet the third criterion of the
test. Id. at 161, 330 N.W.2d at 578. The court ruled, however, that this error was
harmless. Id. at 163-64, 330 N.W.2d at 579.
81. See supra note 14.
82. Gavigan, I I 1 Wis. 2d at 161, 330 N.W.2d at 578 (citing State v. Clark, 87 Wis.
2d 804, 817-18, 275 N.W.2d 715, 722 (1979)).
83. Gavigan, 111 Wis. 2d at 161, 330 N.W.2d at 578.
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evidence of force is highly relevant to the issue of consent
and is generally admissible." 84 Thus the virginity testimony
of Dr. Hilrich was admissible as tending to prove a fact in-
dependent of the complainant's prior sexual conduct rele-
vant to an issue in the case.
B. The Dissent
Justice Heffernan dissented, criticizing the majority's
three-pronged test as a "judicial fabrication that flies in the
teeth of the legislative enactment. 86 He made it clear that,
except for the three listed exceptions, the rape shield law
strips the trial judge of all discretion in admitting sexual his-
tory evidence. 87 These are the only instances when prior sex-
ual conduct evidence is admissible. All other evidence of
prior sexual conduct is barred absolutely, regardless of
whether the court believes it probative of another issue in
the case.88
Justice Heffernan pointed out that there is no basis in
Wisconsin case law for establishing the Gavigan test and al-
lowing sexual history evidence to be admitted on the issue of
consent.89 Consequently, he argued that the jury very likely
decided this case on extraneous factors not relevant to the
incident and on the "legally mistaken belief that . . . be-
cause [S.E.] was a virgin, she did not consent." 90
IV. CRITIQUE
State v. Gavigan9' is a result-oriented opinion which cir-
84. Id. at 162, 330 N.W.2d at 578.
85. Id. The court stated that the trial court's limiting instruction regarding this
evidence was inadequate, but that the error was harmless. Id. at 162-64, 330 N.W.2d
at 578-79.
86. State v. Gavigan, Ill Wis. 2d 150, 167, 330 N.W.2d 571, 580 (1983) (Heifer-
nan, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 168, 330 N.W.2d at 581.
88. Id. at 169, 330 N.W.2d at 581.
89. Id. at 167, 330 N.W.2d at 580. Justice Heffernan pointed out that the court in
Milenkovic v. State, 86 Wis. 2d 272, 272 N.W.2d 320 (Ct. App. 1978) specifically
rejected the view that a woman who is "previously unchaste" is more likely to consent
to an act of sexual intercourse than is a woman who is "strictly virtuous." Gavigan,
111 Wis. 2d at 168, 330 N.W.2d at 581 (Heffernan, J., dissenting).
90. Gavigan, 111 Wis. 2d at 174, 330 N.W.2d at 583 (Heffernan, J., dissenting).
91. 111 Wis. 2d 150, 330 N.W.2d 571 (1983).
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cumvents Wisconsin's rape shield law in order to uphold a
rape conviction. The majority accomplishes this by miscon-
struing a statute and using it as the supposed basis of a new
evidentiary test.
In establishing the three-pronged test, the majority as-
serted that the first two criteria 92 are "in accord with see.
971.31(11)." 93 This statute allows the trial judge discretion
in admitting sexual history evidence if the evidence is proba-
tive of a material issue in the case and the probative value
outweighs the prejudicial effect - similar to the Gavigan
test. However, a close reading of this statute indicates it is
only applicable to evidence "which is admissible under s.
972.11(2). ' 94 There are only three situations in which sexual
history evidence is admissible under section 972.11(2) of the
Wisconsin Statutes. Thus, section 971.31(11) gives the trial
judge discretion in admitting sexual history evidence only if
that evidence applies to one of the three listed exceptions to
the general rule of inadmissibility provided in section
972.11(2). Clearly, none of the three listed exceptions were
applicable to the evidence admitted in Gavigan. However,
the majority used section 971.31(11) as the basis of the Gavi-
gan test and in so doing erroneously read the statute as ap-
plicable to all proffered sexual history evidence.
The court's application of this test to the facts of the case
exposes further weakness in its rationale. Under the first cri-
terion of the Gavigan test, the majority would allow indirect
references to S.E.'s virginity and Dr. Hilrich's testimony on
the grounds that it is "evidence. . . [of] a fact independent
of the complainant's prior sexual conduct which is relevant
to an issue in the case."' 95 That issue is consent. This is con-
trary to modem authority96 and even the majority's own pro-
nouncement that a rape victim's prior sexual conduct "is not
a reliable indicator as to whether she consented to have in-
tercourse with the defendant. 97 Nevertheless, using the
92. See supra text accompanying note 3 for a listing of the court's criteria.
93. Gavigan, 111 Wis. 2d at 157 n.3, 330 N.W.2d at 576 n.3.
94. Wis. STAT. § 971.31(11) (1981-82).
95. Gavigan, 111 Wis. 2d at 157, 330 N.W.2d at 576.
96. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. See also supra note 47 and accom-
panying text.
97. Gavigan, 111 Wis. 2d at 156, 330 N.W.2d at 575.
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Gavigan test, the majority would allow the jury to hear this
evidence as relevant to the issue of consent.
While it might be argued that admitting the conversation
testimony is the only way to actually determine if the victim
consented,98 Dr. Hilrich's testimony that he observed a tear
in S.E.'s hymen stands on different ground. The only fact
this possibly established was that sexual intercourse took
place, something which Gavigan never disputed.99 Yet the
majority stated this is "physical evidence of force' '1c° and
thus admissible on the issue of whether S.E. consented.' 0
Following this logic, every first act of intercourse resulting in
a torn hymen would then necessarily be nonconsensual, or in
other words, a sexual assault.
V. CONCLUSION
While State v. Gavigan 102 serves the state's interest in up-
holding a rape conviction, it now "opens the evidentiary
door"'' 0 3 for the revelation of a complainant's prior sexual
conduct in rape cases. As Justice Heffernan pointed out, de-
fense counsel is now able once again to pry into the victim's
sexual history if it can be shown to "prove a fact independ-
ent of the complainant's prior sexual conduct which is rele-
vant to an issue in the case,"' 1 4 and its probative value
outweighs its prejudicial effect.'0 5 Creating such an eviden-
tiary test is contrary to the manner in which courts in other
98. Justice Heffernan acknowledged this conversation testimony was probably
admissible as the only way to determine if S.E. consented, but only after a determina-
tion that its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect. .d. at 171, 330 N.W.2d
at 582 (Heffernan, J., dissenting).
99. 111 Wis. 2d at 154-55, 330 N.W.2d at 574-75.
100. Id. at 162, 330 N.W.2d at 578.
101. Id.
102. 111 Wis. 2d 150, 330 N.W.2d 571 (1983).
103. Id. at 174, 330 N.W.2d at 583 (Heffernan, J., dissenting). It is important to
note that the Wisconsin Supreme Court has stated "the plain meaning of the words
'prior sexual conduct' includes lack of sexual activity as well." 111Wis. 2dat 159,330
N.W.2d at 576. Therefore, offering evidence of lack of sexual activity "opens the
door" to the offering of prior sexual activity evidence as well.
104. Id. at 166-67, 330 N.W.2d at 580 (Heffernan, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 167, 330 N.W.2d at 581. The majority acknowledged that "a defend-
ant is, of course, entitled to admit evidence relating to a complainant's prior sexual
conduct for a permissible purpose under the test ..... 11 Wis. 2d at 165-66, 330
N.W.2d at 579-80.
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jurisdictions with similar rape shield laws have applied
them. °6 It is also contrary to the intention of the Wisconsin
Legislature'07 and legislatures across the country'0 8 which,
like Wisconsin, have sought to protect the rape victim's pri-
vate life from public exposure and prevent the trial from fo-
cusing on the victim's prior sexual conduct.
Ultimately, admission of sexual history evidence through
the Gavigan test will only add to the humiliation and embar-
rassment of the rape victim'0 9 and decrease the reporting of
rape. 0 The immediate effect of Gavigan will be on jurors'
perceptions in rape trials. Prior sexual conduct evidence is
quite prejudicial, "tending to afford the trier of fact an op-
portunity for distraction.""' It also invokes jurors'
prejudices and hazards the prospect that they will punish the
victim for immoral behavior or reward her for moral
behavior.' 1 2
In response to the possible ramifications of the Gavigan
holding, the Wisconsin Legislature has recently taken steps
to add a subsection to the rape shield law. Senate Bill 362 3
106. See supra notes 36-65 and accompanying text.
107. Justice Heffernan noted that the intention of the Wisconsin Legislature in
passing the rape shield law was to protect the complaining witness from public expo-
sure of her private life. Gavigan, 111 Wis. 2d at 166, 330 N.W.2d at 580 (Heffernan,
J., dissenting).
108. Such intention is supported by the fact that almost every state has a rape
shield law. See supra note 18.
109. The trauma of the rape victim has been well documented. See Bohmer &
Blumberg, Twice Traumatized- The Rape Victim and the Court, 58 JUDICATURE 391
(1975); Comment, Rape and Rape Laws. Sexism in Society and Law, 61 CALIF. L.
REv. 919 (1973); Note, If She Consented Once, She Consented.Again -4 A Legal Fal-
lacy In Forcible Rape Cases, 10 VAL. U.L. REV. 127 (1975).
110. Rape is one of the most underreported crimes. Tanford & Bocchino, supra
note 19, at 547. Some have suggested that the number of rapes is ten times the
number reported. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 23, at 5.
111. Milenkovic v. State, 86 Wis. 2d 272, 281, 272 N.W.2d 320, 324 (Ct. App.
1978).
112. One study found that when jurors heard information regarding an alleged
rape victim's prior sexual history, it decreased their perceived guilt of the accused in
comparison with a situation in which no information relating to the victim's past sex
life was heard. Catton, Evidence Regarding the Prior Sexual History of an Alleged
Rape Victim -Its Effect on the Perceived Guilt of the Accused, 33 U. TORONTO FAC. L.
REv. 165, 173 (1975). See also H. KALUEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 249
(1966) (study indicating juries tend to scrutinize the rape complainant closely and
sympathize with the defendant whenever there is the slightest indication that the com-
plainant's character is less than perfect).
113. Wis. S.B. 362 (1983) provides:
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would abrogate the Gavigan test by providing that, in effect,
the three listed exceptions to the rape shield law are the only
exceptions to the general rule that evidence of a complain-
ant's prior sexual conduct is not admissible in a sexual as-
sault case. Thus, a court may not judicially create a fourth
exception to this rule, as the majority did in Gavigan.
It is also possible that the Wisconsin Supreme Court it-
self might diminish the impact of Gavigan by limiting it to its
facts. In a future case the court might clarify the Gavigan
holding as applicable only to evidence concerning the vic-
tim's virginity offered by the prosecution, and not to evi-
dence of her prior sexual conduct offered by the defense.' 1 4
However, the court must consider that it expressly stated in
Gavigan that "a defendant is, of course, entitled to admit
evidence relating to a complainant's prior sexual conduct for
a permissible purpose under the test. .. ."15 Such a hold-
ing would also create fairness and confrontation problems
for the defendant. Given these considerations, Senate Bill
362 is the better approach to closing the evidentiary door
opened by the Gavigan majority.
Regardless of the eventual resolution of the Gavigan rule,
the case should illustrate to Wisconsin's criminal trial court
An act to create s. 972.11(2)(c) of the statutes, relating to limiting the admissi-
bility of evidence in a sexual assault case. Section 1. 972.11(2)(c) of the stat-
utes is created to read: Notwithstanding s. 901.06, the limitation on the
admission of evidence or of reference to the prior sexual conduct of the com-
plaining witness in par. (b) applies regardless of the purpose of the admission
or reference unless the admission is expressly permitted under par. (b) 1, 2, or
3.
114. The Wisconsin Supreme Court may have already begun to move in this di-
rection. In State v. Droste, 115 Wis. 2d 48, 339 N.W.2d 578 (1983), the defendant was
convicted of first-degree sexual assault. The victim was an undercover narcotics of-
ficer assigned to investigate the defendant as a possible drug suspect. The defendant
claimed the victim had consented. At trial, he attempted to prove this with evidence
that in the past the victim had used consensual sexual conduct as a method of gaining
a suspect's trust and thus obtaining drugs from him. The defendant claimed the vic-
tim's accusation of sexual assault in this case was in retaliation for his refusal to make
a large sale of drugs to her.
The supreme court upheld the trial court's exclusion of this evidence under the
rape shield statute. Although the defendant's evidence arguably was "relevant to an
issue in the case independent of the complainant's prior sexual activity" (consent), the
Droste court did not even mention Gavigan in its opinion. This might suggest that
Gavigan is limited to its facts and therefore applies only to a situation where the
prosecutor offers evidence of the victim's virginity.
115. Gavigan, 111 Wis. 2d at 165-66, 330 N.W.2d at 579-80.
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judges the unyielding legislative intention to protect the vic-
tim who testifies in a sexual assault case. This public policy
dictates a strict application of Wisconsin's rape shield law
when, in future sexual assault cases, the court is faced with
evidence of a complainant's prior sexual conduct.
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